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Abstract The assumption that psychological states and processes are computational in
character pervades much of cognitive science, what many call the computational theory
of mind. In addition to occupying a central place in cognitive science, the computa-
tional theory of mind has also had a second life supporting Bindividualism^, the view
that psychological states should be taxonomized so as to supervene only on the
intrinsic, physical properties of individuals. One response to individualism has been
to raise the prospect of Bwide computational systems^, in which some computational
units are instantiated outside the individual. BWide computationalism^ attempts to
sever the link between individualism and computational psychology by enlarging the
concept of computation. However, in spite of its potential interest to cognitive science,
wide computationalism has received little attention in philosophy of mind and cognitive
science. This paper aims to revisit the prospect of wide computationalism. It is argued
that by appropriating a mechanistic conception of computation wide computationalism
can overcome several issues that plague initial formulations. The aim is to show that
cognitive science has overlooked an important and viable option in computational
psychology. The paper marshals empirical support and responds to possible objections.
1 Introduction
Jerry Fodor once claimed that: Bquite independent of one’s assumptions about the
details of psychological theories of cognition, their general structure presupposes
underlying computational processes^ (1975, p.28). Fast forward 30 years and views
have changed little. Paul Thagard, for example, writes: B[t]he central hypothesis of
cognitive science is that thinking can best be understood in terms of representational
structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures^
(2010, p.6). Suffice it to say, the assumption that psychological states and processes are
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computational in character pervades much of cognitive science, what many call the
Bcomputational theory of mind^.
Yet in addition to occupying a central place in cognitive science, the computational
theory of mind has also had a second life supporting Bindividualism^, the view that
psychological states should be taxonomized so as to supervene only on the intrinsic,
physical properties of individuals (Fodor 1980, 1987; Stich 1983; Egan 1992). One
route to individualistic psychology is what Robert Wilson calls the Bcomputational
argument for individualism.^Wilson (1994, p.353) formulates the argument as follows:
(1) Cognitive psychology taxonomically individuates mental states and processes
only qua computational states and processes.
(2) The computational states and processes that an individual instantiates supervene
on the intrinsic, physical states of that individual.
(3) Therefore, Cognitive psychology individuates only states and processes that
supervene on the intrinsic, physical states of the individual who instantiates those
states and processes.
One response to the computational argument has been to challenge premise (2). This
is the route adopted by Wilson (1994, 1995). Wilson argues that since not all compu-
tational processes are instantiated in the head, not all psychology is individualistic.
Wilson raises the prospect of Bwide computational systems^, in which some compu-
tational units are instantiated outside the individual. By enlarging the concept of
computation, Wilson attempts to sever the link between individualism and computa-
tional psychology.
The idea of Bwide computationalism^ is more than a little interesting. Not only does
it represent a substantial departure from orthodox thinking in cognitive science (Marr
1982; Pylyshyn 1984), but it also offers distinct grounds for thinking about extended
cognition (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Rowlands 1999; Wilson 2004; Wilson and Clark
2009). However, for one reason or another, wide computationalism has received little
attention in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Though there has been some
scattered discussion, no sustained analysis has been offered. This paper aims to revisit
the prospect of wide computationalism.
The problem is that several issues plague initial formulations of wide
computationalism. For this reason, focus here is given to buttressing the view via recent
discussions of Bmechanistic^ computation (Piccinini 2007, 2015; Milkowski 2015). The
argument is that by appropriating a mechanistic conception of computation the problems
that emerge for earlier formulations ofwide computationalism can be avoided (sections 3
and 4). The goal is to show that cognitive science has overlooked an important and
viable option in computational psychology. On route to this conclusion, the paper
marshals empirical support for Bwide mechanistic computation^ and responds to pos-
sible objections (sections 5 and 6).
A quick clarification is in order before discussion gets going. Wide
computationalism, as Wilson presents the view and how it is developed here, is not
meant as a global thesis. It does not imply that all computational systems are instan-
tiated, at least in part, outside the body. Rather, the view is better understood as a
supplement to individualistic psychology. It is an extension of the logic of computa-
tional analysis in cognitive science, rather than a replacement.
502 L. Kersten
2 Wide Computationalism
In the abstract, wide computationalism gains a foothold via the location neutrality of
computational individuation. Because the method of computational analysis is non-
committal about the kinds of physical states that might be computationally character-
ized, it is at least possible that some of the relevant computational states might reside
outside the individual. Wilson, for instance, writes: BThere is nothing in the method of
computational individuation itself…which implies that the class of physical features
mapped by a realization function cannot include members that are part of the environ-
ment of the individual^ (1994, p.355). Since formal systems are indifferent to physical
medium and computation is a formal system, it is at least possible that some compu-
tational states and processes reside outside the individual.
The location neutrality of computational analysis also carries with it implications for
psychological theorizing. This is because if psychological states and processes are
computational in character and computational analysis is location neutral, then some
psychological states or processes may extend beyond the boundary of the individual.
As Hutchins points out in his discussion of Marr (1982): BMarr intended his [compu-
tational] framework to be applied to cognitive processes that take place inside an
individual, but there is no reason, in principle, to confine it to such a narrow conception
of cognition^ (1995, p.50). The allegiance of psychology to computational theory
carries with it the potential for extended cognition (see, e.g., Hutchins 1995; Wilson
2004; Kersten 2015; Kersten and Wilson 2016). Whether or not computational cogni-
tive systems are instantiated exclusively within the boundary of the individual is an a
posteriori question.
Wilson furthers develops wide computationalism by outlining a method for identi-
fying wide systems. He writes: BThe account of actual implementation is a generaliza-
tion of that in the case of narrow computational systems: a wide computational system
implements the ‘program’ physically stored in the environment with which it causally
interacts^ (1994, p.360). Similar to identifying Bnarrow^ (in-the-head) computational
systems, wide computational systems are present if there is a computational description
that tracks causal transitions running from an organism’s environment to its internal
physical states.
Interestingly, in identifying wide systems in this way Wilson aligns wide
computationalism with Bcausal mapping accounts^ of computation (Chrisley 1995;
Chalmers 1994, 1996; Scheutz 1999, 2001). Accounts of this stripe claim that for a
physical system to perform a computation there must be a mapping from a subset of
states ascribed to a physical system by a physical description to states defined by a
computational description. For any computational state transition of the form S1→ S2,
if a system is in a physical state that maps onto S1, then the physical state that maps to
S1 must cause the system to go into a further physical state that maps onto S2 (see
Piccinini 2015, ch.2). Causal mapping accounts articulate the conditions for ascription
of computational implementation in terms of isomorphic mappings between computa-
tional descriptions and physical descriptions via transitions between physical states.1
1 Causal mapping accounts get cashed out in various ways. Some opt for a counterfactual approach, others a
dispositional approach. The important point is that in all cases what actually ground computations is causal
relations.
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Commitment to the causal mapping account is more fully revealed in Wilson’s
comment that: B[f]or a physical device to be capable of implementing a given program
[computation] is for it to have its physical states configured in such a way that
transitions between those states are isomorphic to transitions between states that the
program specifies^ (1994, p.360). The identification of actual computations, whether
narrow or wide, requires mapping computational states to physical states in virtue of
tracking causal relations between physical states.
Proponents of wide computationalism not only think that the notion is coherent, but
that some organisms actually implement wide computational systems. Wilson, for
instance, offers two examples of what he takes to be wide computational systems.
The first is Sekuler and Blake’s (1990) multiple spatial channels theory of vision and
form perception. The crucial feature of this account is that specific sets of neurons are
sensitive to specific sets of stimuli. These stimuli are decomposable into sinusoidal
gratings with four parameters: spatial frequency, contrast, orientation, and spatial phase.
Any natural scene can be decomposed into these formal primitives. For Sekuler and
Blake, perception is the result of organisms processing environmental inputs through
spatial channels and turning them into complex internal representations.
What is crucial about this example for Wilson is that the account acknowledges the
computational role states beyond the individual play within perceptual processes. The
computational analysis involves, first, identifying and describing the formal primitives
instantiated in the physical environment and, second, describing how such inputs
function to produce internal representations. Instead of viewing computation as begin-
ning at the retina and ending at the visual cortex, Wilson maintains that computational
analysis begins further downstream in the environment of the perceiving organism.
Framing things in terms of the causal mapping account, the claim is that there is a
computational description amenable to the physical states internal and external to the
organism that help to explain form perception.
It is also worth noting that although there is sometimes a tendency in discussions of
extended cognition to devalue or even dismiss the need for internal representations,
there is nothing strictly antithetical about the two notions (see, e.g., Wilson 2004; Clark
2008). Wide computational systems of the kind relevant to extended cognition can
trade in internal information-bearing vehicles just as easily as they can external ones.
What is important is the role internal or external information-bearing vehicles play in
the larger computational analysis. The appeal to internal representations in Wilson’s
examples is simply the logical extension of pushing computational analysis further out
into the environment.2
The second example Wilson offers is Gallistel’s (1989a, 1989b) account of animal
spatial navigation. Wilson points out that according to Gallistel’s theory, animals
construct complex representations of their environments in order to guide behaviour
by instantiating modules sensitive to formal geometric structures of the environment.
One example of this process is dead reckoning in ants and bees. These organisms take
as their inputs three features: the animal’s solar heading, forward speed and a repre-
sentation of the solar azimuth. What they produce is a representation of position relative
to some landmark. There is a physical process characterizable as a computational
process that begins in the environment and ends in the organisms, specifically as a
2 See Chemero (2011) or Varela et al. (1991) for an alternative perspective.
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representation of relative position. Framed again in terms of the causal mapping
account, there is a causal transition between physical states isomorphically related to
a computational description of spatial orientation. There is a subset of physical states
that track transitions between computational state descriptions.
A third example of wide computation comes from Edward Hutchins’ (1995) work
on navigation. Hutchins contends that when members of a navigation team carry out
coordinating actions in service of a larger task – for example, navigating a ship at sea –
they form a larger computational system that transcends the individual team members.
Navigation – that is, the task of figuring out where something is relative to other
positions – is achieved not only through the local actions of individual team members,
such as the Navigator or Fathometer Operator, but also through the coordinated activity
of the team members as a whole. Hutchins, for instance, writes: BIn their communication
and in their joint actions, the members of the navigation team superimpose themselves on
the network of material computational tools of the trade^ (1995, p.219). The navigational
team can be thought of as a wide computational system because the functional whole
extends beyond the local actions of individual team members. The social organization
becomes the computational architecture on which the larger functional task is carried out.
Putting asideminor differences among the examples for themoment, the central message
is that wide computational systems are not only theoretically possible, but that they are
physically implemented in a number of cases. 3 For authors such as Wilson and Hutchins,
the fact that research in human and animal psychology provide putative examples of
concrete computational systems beyond the boundary of the individual is further vindication
of the idea that at least some portion of computational psychology is not individualistic.
3 Concrete Computation
One of the main problems for computational theories of mind is the problem of
Bcomputational implementation^ (Chalmers 1994, 1996, 2011; Sprevak 2012). The
issue is one of how to specify the conditions under which computations can be said to
take place in physical systems. If psychological states and processes are computational
in structure, then any successful account of computation has to explain how those
computational states and processes are instantiated in physical systems. Without a
successful account of computational implementation, the chances of a robust computa-
tional cognitive science diminish.
3 One point of difference between Wilson and Hutchins’ views lies in the breadth of the computational system
identified. Wilson’s examples identify wide computational systems applying to largely brain/environment
composites; while, in contrast, Hutchins broadens the reach to include individual agents. This results in a
difference in emphasis when it comes to the location of representational states within each system. For Wilson,
because the wide computational system runs from the formal primitives of the environment to the processing
centers of the brain, the representational states are located within the brain; whereas for Hutchins, the
representational states relevant to defining the navigational computation are spread out across the coordinated
activity of the individual team members (see Hutchins 1995, ch.4). Though at this first glance this difference
might seem notable, particularly in light of some hostility occasionally leveled by proponents of extended
cognition toward internal representations, nothing crucially important hangs on it. Rather, the difference
emerges largely as a result of the differing computational units emphasized within each analysis. The scope
and elements of the computational system help determine the kind and location of representational states
implicated.
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Several proposals have been offered, perhaps most famously Putnam’s (1967)
mapping account. Of interest here is the solution offered by wide computationalism.
Recall that wide computationalism subscribed to the causal mapping account of
computation. For the causal mapping account, concrete computations occur just in
those cases where there is a mapping of computational to physical descriptions tracking
causal transitions between physical states. By specifying the isomorphic relations
between physical states and computational states via causal transitions, the causal
mapping account provides a resolution to the problem of implementation, and thus
so too does wide computationalism.
However, a solution to the problem computational implementation is only one
desideratum on an account of computation. This is because not only should an account
of computation explain how physical systems compute it should also do justice to the
sciences of computation. It should strive to do right by the practices of computer
scientists, engineers, and cognitive scientists. Piccinini (2015, ch.1) highlights six such
desiderata:
(1) Objectivity. The account should make whether a system performs a particular
computation a matter of fact. It should establish some form of objectivity on
questions of computational implementation.
(2) Explanation. The account should explain the behaviour of computing systems in
terms of the procedures being executed. It should say how appeals to program
execution, and more generally to computation, explain the behavior of computing
systems.
(3) The right things compute. The account should include the paradigmatic examples
of computing mechanisms, e.g., finite state automata, Universal Turing machines,
etc.
(4) The wrong things don’t compute. The account should not entail paradigmatic
examples of non-computing mechanisms, e.g., galaxies, digestive systems, etc.
(5) Miscomputation. The account should explain how computations can go wrong.
(6) Taxonomy. The account should provide a taxonomy that is able to distinguish
between different kinds of computing machines, e.g., finite state automata, Uni-
versal Turing machines, calculators, etc.
The question is whether wide computationalism, as a computational theory of mind,
satisfies these six desiderata. If it does not, then it may not be a viable account of
computational cognition.
First, does wide computationalism provide some form of objectivity about compu-
tation? By endorsing the causal mapping account, it would appear so. Wide
computationalism restricts the class of physical systems that can be said to implement
computations by admitting only those systems that map computational descriptions to
physical state transitions.4 Deciding whether or not a system computes is in some sense
a matter of fact according to wide computationalism.
4 This is in contrast to simple mapping accounts, such as Putnam (1967), that place no restrictions on the
physical states that might form the equivalence class for computational description. This is why Putnam is
skeptical of computational theories of mind.
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Second, does wide computationalism account for how program execution explains
computing behaviour? Here the account stumbles. To qualify as a computational
explanation, wide computationalism must explain how a program generates a system’s
behaviour via a rule or program.5 The problem is that although wide computationalism
describes where a program is represented by causal transitions (for example, the
ephemeris function in the case of animal spatial navigation), it does not show how
physical systems deploy or execute computational programs in the production of
behaviour. Although the causal mapping account provides a computational model or
description, it does not offer a computational explanation.
With respect to the third desideratum, wide computationalism performs satisfacto-
rily. This is because it entails that there is some subset of physical states in most
computing devices – for example, digital computers and calculators – that can be
mapped to computational descriptions. Under a wide computational rubric, it is possi-
ble for each paradigmatic computing device to map from some of its physical states to
the relevant computational states.
The fourth desideratum is not so easily met. OnWilson’s formulation, physical states
of paradigmatic non-computational processes, such as the weather or respiration, can
also be mapped to computational descriptions. The problem is that non-paradigmatic
cases also trade in the right kind of causal transitions such that they can be mapped to
computational state descriptions. Although it manages to account for cognitive systems
and computers, wide computationalism also problematically entails that physical sys-
tems that should otherwise not count as computing systems nonetheless qualify. In short,
the causal mapping account underwriting wide computationalism is too liberal.
Fifth, does wide computationalism account for miscomputation? Here, again, the
account stumbles. Miscomputation requires that a computational system deliver the
wrong output. In the case of a wide computational system, this entails that, for example,
with respect an animal’s spatial navigation system in Wilson’s second example, a wide
computational process could be mapped to the wrong output. But this does not appear
possible given the causal-mapping account. In each case of wide computation, the
computational description will map to the correct physical states (e.g., the animal’s
solar heading, forward speed and a representation of the solar azimuth). The account
cannot but deliver the correct relative position. Part of the problem is that causal
mapping accounts can be generated regardless of whether a computation produces
the correct result.
Finally, does wide computationalism provide a taxonomy of computing devices? In
line with its handling of desideratum (1), wide computationalism does seem to be able,
at least in principle, to furnish a categorization of computing mechanisms on the basis
of casual powers. This is because only some systems will support physical transitions
that can be mapped to a computational description. Wide computationalism provides
enough matter of fact about which physical systems support computations to distin-
guish between the powers of different computing systems.
In sum, as an account of concrete computation, wide computationalism is strong
with respect to desiderata (1), (3), and (6), but weak with respect to (2), (4), and (5). Not
5 This does not necessarily imply that computing system need to represent a rule internally, for this would
overly restrict computational explanation, excluding paradigmatic cases of computing devices such as the
finite state automata.
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a bad performance, but things could be better. Part of the reason for this less than ideal
showing is the view’s allegiance to the causal mapping account. The weaknesses of the
casual mapping account carry through to wide computationalism. More positively, the
prognosis is that if the underlying account of computation can be updated, then this
may supply wide computationalism with the resources to address the outstanding
desiderata, ultimately saving it from the dustbin of promising but unworkable ideas.
4 Mechanistic Computation
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007, 2015) has recently laid out an account of physical compu-
tation that he dubs Bthe mechanist account^ (see also Milkowski 2015). In what
follows, I argue that the mechanistic account can be used to update the conceptual
foundations of wide computationalism. This update allows the view to meet the three
desiderata that caused trouble for earlier formulations.
Piccinini outlines three conditions for concrete computation. The first is that physical
computing systems must be kinds of functional mechanisms. The system has to possess
properties that organize in such a way so as to produce or support some behaviour – the
reverse of which is that if a system fails to perform its function it must be the result of a
breakdown in the organization of the system’s component parts.
The second condition is that one of the capacities of a mechanism must be the ability
to compute at least one mathematical function. The system must be able to map from an
input I (and possibly internal states S) to an output O. The system’s behaviour must
satisfy at least one abstract description mapping inputs to outputs – this also suffices to
show that the system is following a rule.
The final condition is that a physical computing systemmust compute its function via the
manipulation of medium-independent vehicles. This means that informational vehicles –
whether they are numbers, symbols, or retinal images –must be transformed over the course
of a computation in virtue of a system’s sensitivity to some part of the vehicle’s structure. So,
for example, in the case of numbers or symbols, this would involve processing vehicles in
virtue of their syntactic structure; while in the case of neural representations, it would
involve processing vehicles in virtue of their systematic relational structure. The point is that
if the input–output mapping is sensitive to at least some portion of the medium-independent
vehicle over which it is defined, then it counts as a computation.
So, putting these three components together, the mechanistic account claims that
concrete computation occurs wherever there is a physical system that has an organiza-
tion of spatiotemporal components such that it computes an abstract function in virtue of
manipulating medium-independent vehicles. As Piccinini describes the view: BConcrete
computing systems are physical systems that are functionally organized to manipulate
medium-independent vehicles in accordance with a rule that applies to all vehicles and
depends on the medium-independent properties of the vehicles (and possibly the
system’s internal states) for its application^ (2015, p.5). The emphasis is on functionally
integrated systems that compute at least one abstract function via vehicle manipulation.6
6 There is more to Piccinini’s account then what is presented here. However, this description should suffice to
outline the basic features of the view. For a fuller description see Piccinini (2015, ch.7).
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An example might help. Consider the neural network in the ocularmotor system
responsible for horizontal eye movement (Robinson 1989; Leigh and Zee 2006). This
system exhibits all the characteristics of a mechanistic computing system. First, the
system is a causally integrated connection of spatiotemporal components (neurons)
poised to produce some behaviour (eye movement). It is a functional mechanism.
Second, the system computes at least one abstract function (an integration relation). It
does so in virtue of preserving the relationship between eye-velocity and eye-position.
Third, the system computes its function via the manipulation or transformation of
medium-independent vehicles: information contained within the cortex. Morphic rela-
tions between eye-velocity and eye-position are manipulated to compute horizontal eye
movement. The ocular-motor system satisfies each of the three conditions on mecha-
nistic computation.
The mechanistic account is also distinct from causal mapping accounts on at least
two fronts. First, it holds that computing systems are functional systems of a specific
mechanistic type; second, it holds that computation is achieved through the use of
medium-independent vehicles. Although the causal mapping account acknowledges the
importance of causally integrated systems, the mechanistic account takes this condition
further. This is because in addition to specifying in what ways physical structures can
be processed, the mechanistic account also requires substantive organizational integra-
tion. It places more stringent conditions on when physical states can be interpreted as
performing computations than the causal mapping account.
As promising as all this sounds, before the mechanistic account can serve as the
basis for an updated wide computationalism, it also has to be shown that it can satisfy
the six desiderata previously outlined. Consider each desideratum in turn.
First, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the mechanistic account settles the objectivity
question. The specification of several conditions for concrete computation makes it a
matter of fact as to whether a given physical system is a computing system –
correspondingly, this also means that the account provides a solution to the problem
of computational implementation.
With respect to the second desideratum, the account is successfully able to navigate
the computational explanation versus modeling distinction. To see why, consider the
ocular-motor example again. There, it was in virtue of the integration function that the
system was able to compute horizontal eye movement. The system implemented a
program or rule in the service of particular behaviour. The output of the system,
horizontal eye movement, was the direct result of the function computed. One of the
system’s functions is to compute eye position using an integration relation – the system
instantiates a computational procedure rather than simply being described as having one.
How about desiderata (3) and (4)? Here, again, the mechanistic account is more
resilient than its causal mapping counterpart. Recall that the problem for the causal
mapping account was that it was unable to exclude non-paradigmatic cases, e.g.,
respiration, solar systems, etc. The reason was that it was too liberal in its mapping
conditions; a large number of non-computing systems qualified as computational in
virtue of having the right kind of causal transitions between physical states.7 In contrast,
the mechanistic account strikes a better balance. It places further restrictions on physical
7 This is why science is filled with computational models. The mathematics of computation is particularly
effective at describing and predicating natural phenomena (see Frigg 2012).
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computation. Consider, for example, the digestive system. Though the digestive system
is appropriately described as a functional mechanism, it fails to meet an abstract
functional description in terms of computing medium-independent variables. It there-
fore fails to qualify as a computing system. The addition of the functional mechanism
and medium-independent processing requirements serves to exclude the wrong sorts of
physical systems.
Fifth, the mechanistic account explains how a computing system can miscompute.
This is because it focuses attention on how mechanisms can break down. Piccinini
(2015, ch.7) points out that a computing mechanism is evaluable according to five
perspectives: (i) how its designers intended it to compute a function, (ii) whether it is
actually designed to compute a particular function but was built in such a way that it
actually computes a different function, (iii) whether what was built malfunctions, (iv)
whether the system is misconfigured (e.g., programed wrongly), (v) and whether the
system is used incorrectly. In each case, whether through fault of designer, builder, or
user, the miscomputation rests with the functional organization of the system. Func-
tional organization is indispensable to the construction, execution and interpretation of
computing systems. By requiring physical systems to be functional mechanisms, the
mechanistic account successfully offers an explanation of miscomputation, because it
draws attention to how the integration of spatiotemporal components drives when, how,
and why physical systems miscompute.
Finally, the mechanistic account can taxonomize computing systems. This follows in
virtue of its ability to distinguish between various mechanistic properties. For example,
‘being programmable’ requires having certain transducers and storage capacities.
Computing systems that fail to have these properties might still compute, but may
not be programmable – most Turing-machines would meet this description. By appeal-
ing to properties of functional organization, the mechanistic account takes advantage of
the fact that mechanistic properties have computational implications.
It seems that the mechanistic account, at least as developed by Piccinini, provides a
robust account of concrete computation. Not only does it provide a solution to the
problem of implementation, but it also does so in a way that it does justice to the
sciences of computation.
5 Wide Mechanistic Computation
The question to consider is whether it is possible for physical computing systems of the
type described by the mechanistic account to include elements outside the individual –
that is, whether the mechanistic account can be squared with wide computationalism.
The answer turns out to be rather straightforward. The reason is that, similar to the
casual mapping account, themechanistic account also remains neutral about what physical
parts of the world can be integrated so as to form a physical computing system. Similar to
the causal mapping account, the method of computational individuation is location
neutral. Whether or not a functional mechanism, one that processes medium-
independent vehicles, is constituted by spatiotemporal components squarely localized
within the individual or crisscrossing into the world is entirely an a posteriori question.
Some physical computing cognitive systems might be entirely ensconced within the body,
but some might as easily spread out over brain, body and world.
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Piccinini even acknowledges this possibility in a footnote to his chapter on the
mechanistic account: BI am officially neutral on whether the components of psycho-
logical computing mechanisms extend beyond the spatial boundaries of organisms^
(2015, ch.7). Piccinini recognizes that whether psychological computing mechanisms
are constituted in part by components outside the individual is an empirical question.
Because the mechanistic conditions on concrete computations are medium and location
neutral, the question of wide computational systems is open. The real task, then, is to
show that some organisms in fact implement wide mechanistic computing systems.
There are two examples I want to draw on in establishing the empirical plausibility
of wide mechanistic computation. In each case, the focus is on active sensory systems.
The first is sonar-emitting bats. Bats have become a staple example of active sensory
systems since it was discovered that they hunt using self-generated acoustic signals
(echolocation) (MacIver, 2009). Consider one aspect of echolocation: object detection.
Bats use two different methods for object detection. On horizontal planes, bats use time
and intensity differences in the returning acoustic signals to detect objects; while on
vertical planes, the bats’ inner ear, the pinna-tragus, forms a pathway through which the
incoming signal is filtered. The formation of the skin and supporting tissue transforms
the signal into a range of spectral cues, which then get further processed neuronally.
There are two points to note about this example. First, the acoustic signal is more
than just a passive input to the bats’ navigation system. The propagation of acoustic
pulses actively drives obstacle detection. Second, it is the neural processing plus
morphology and acoustic environment that facilitates object detection. The neuronal
processing alone is insufficient. What this suggests is that the bats’ ability to detect
objects along vertical planes is realized by spatiotemporal components spread out
across the brain, body and world. The bats’ spatial navigation system is supported by
a wide mechanism.8 This is the first condition on mechanistic computation.
Why view these components as forming a wide mechanism rather than casually
related but distinct elements? The answer lies in the high degree of organization and
structure exhibited by the components. It is only through the coordinated activity of
parts spread across the brain, body and world that vertical object detection is achieved.
It is not just that the acoustic signal and morphology of the bat that play a role in the
delivering inputs to the internal processing. It is that both actively construct and
transform the information latter used for internal processing. They are part of the
underlying causal mechanism responsible for the animals’ perceptual capacity.
What about condition two? What abstract function is being computed? The answer
here is one already encountered: object detection. Because there is a clear mapping
from the acoustic signals outside the bat to the internal outputs (representation of
objects in the vertical plane) via the simplifying structure of the pinna-tragus, the wide
mechanism can be said to compute at least one abstract function. The difference in this
case is that the input resides neither on nor in the bats’ sensory transducers. Rather, it is
part of the environment. The acoustic signals on which the bats’ inner ear operates
already contain information about objects in the environment.
Finally, Piccinini also claimed that a mechanism must compute a function in virtue
of manipulating some portion of medium-independent vehicles. Gibson’s (1966, 1986)
8 For another example of a wide mechanism see Wilson’s (2010, 2014) discussion of the giant water bug:
Lethocerus.
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notion of Binvariants^ offers a useful starting point here. For Gibson, interactions of
mechanical forces often produce systematic, structural regularities in the environment.
These invariants are picked up by organism’s perceptual system. They are used to
guide, sustain, and regulate behaviour. For example, because light is constantly diffused
and reflected throughout the environment, there are optical textures that overlay
surfaces. The amount of texture corresponds to the amount of terrain. As the density
of optical texture increases, the scale of the space is revealed. Optical textures provide
crucial information about the environment that an organism’s perceptual system can
use to gauge distance.
Acoustic signals operate in an analogous way. Because sonic energy refracts and
diffuses through gases, liquids, and solids, the arrangement of the environment and the
medium of transmission shape the vibratory field in which bats navigate. It structures
acoustic signals, providing important cues about object location and distance. This
means that the vehicles transformed over the course of processing are external
information-bearing structures. They are medium-independent vehicles that are persis-
tent and unchanged over time and which carry information about the environment.
Manipulation of the informational vehicles runs from the environment through the
pinna tragus to the bat’s brain.
Notice that the external vehicles are not medium-independent in virtue of the fact
that they carry information, but rather in virtue of the fact that the relevant computations
are sensitive to only some portion of the informational vehicles, i.e. the invariant
structure of the acoustic signal carrying information about location and direction. What
matters for computation is not that the bat is responsive to the sound qua sound, but that
the bat is responsive to the sound qua information-bearing structures within the sound.
As Piccinini explains: BSince concrete computation and their vehicles can be defined
independently of the physical media that implement them, we shall call them Bmedium
independent^ (2011, p.8). The abstract character of computational descriptions means
that medium-independence follows in virtue of the relevance of specific parts of
physical media to the overall computation being carried out, whether that is syntactic
structure in symbols or invariant relational structure in sound.
Given the above, there seems to be good reason to think that the bats’ navigation
system instantiates a wide computational system of the mechanistic variety. Not only
does it involve a mechanism that spans the brain, body and world, but it also computes
an abstraction function via the transformation of medium-independent vehicles. It
meets all three requirements of the mechanistic account.
Animal cognition is one thing, but is there a human example? Continuing with the
idea of active sensory systems, the next case to consider is spatial navigation by
sightless or blind individuals.
One common assumption is that sightless individuals are at a greater disadvantage
than sighted individuals during spatial navigation because of a lack of crucial visual
information (Lynch 1960). Several studies have recently begun to cast doubt on this
assumption, as spatial competence has been found to be increasingly less dependent on
visual experience than initially thought. Ricciardi et al. (2009), for example, have
shown that the sound of an action engages the mirror neuron system for action
schemas, even when not learned through the visual modality.
One important take away from this research is that it suggests the use of a
supramodal sensory representation in spatial navigation. This result is important
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because it comports well with how spatial navigation is mainly achieved within
sightless individuals – that is, through the collection of spatial information via haptic
and audio channels. A critical component of this collection process is the systematic
feedback of haptic information through prosthetic devices, such as cranes or personal
assistive devices, in addition to hands, palms and fingers – canes, for example, provide
low-resolution information about the immediate environment through a semi-spherical
exploratory sweeping motion. What I want to suggest is that, similar to the bats’ sonar-
emitting echolocation system, the prosthetic-aided navigation system can be thought of
as a wide mechanism, one that supports an abstract function through which medium-
independent vehicles are manipulated. Notice how the example meets the three mech-
anistic conditions.
Consider the first condition. Under normal circumstances, it is undoubtedly correct
to say that spatial navigation is supported by an internally constituted mechanism.
However, in the case of sightless individuals, the breakdown of internal components
requires recruitment of external substitutes. This is the role occupied by prosthetics
such as canes or personal assistive devices, which can even include sonar-emitting
devices (Lahav and Mioduser 2008). Under these conditions, the integrated spatiotem-
poral components form a wide mechanism. They form an integrated mechanism that
spreads out beyond the neuronal.
Next, consider what function is computed by this wide mechanism. One possible
answer is that the haptic information delivered by prosthetic devise aids in the
construction of a Bsurvey representation^, a disposition or layout of spatial features –
direction and distance, for example (Loomis et al. 1993). The purpose of this repre-
sentation is to facilitate finding trajectories or routes through the environment.
Interpreted in this way, the abstract function is one that runs from the environmental
signals generated from the repeated tapping of the prosthetic device to the internal
spatial representation of the environment. There is a mapping of inputs I to output O via
the prosthetic device.
Lastly, the spatial navigation system of sightless individuals involves manip-
ulating medium-independent vehicles. The active exploratory strategies used by
sightless individuals transform and manipulate environmental structures, partic-
ularly sonic and tactile information, in order to simplify and reduce internal
processing. Much like the pinna-tragus of the bat, the prosthetic devices form
morphological tools through which information is externally directed. There is a
transformation of sensory information through external then internal structures.
Once again, these considerations point toward the presence of a wide mecha-
nistic computational system.
Actual examples of wide computational systems, such as the above, are
important. As Segal points out in his review of Wilson: Bthe question of the
truth of wide computationalism is a question about the proper domain of
psychological theories (or at least cognitively scientific theories), it is a
question about the extent of the natural phenomenon of cognition^ (1997, p.
154). Without a demonstration of wide physical computing systems, the idea
of wide mechanistic computation remains plausible but unsubstantiated. What I
have tried to do, like Wilson and Hutchins beforehand, is show that in some
cases wide computational systems are, in fact, implemented in cognizing
agents.
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6 Objections
Time to consider some possible concerns. First, one might worry that wide
computationalism, even of the mechanistic variety, fails to offer principled grounds
on which to distinguish internal (brain bound) cognitive systems from wide cognitive
systems. Given that a fair amount of cognitive science attempts to distinguish the
underlying systems supporting psychological behaviour, wide computationalism
should be able to make such an important differentiation.
Two points are worth considering here. First, recall that the computational theory of
mind leaves open the possibility that some computational systems are realized by
elements outside the individual. That is at least part of the moral of classic multiple
realizability. Second, recall that any successful account of concrete computation is going
to have to provide a taxonomy of different computing systems (desideratum six).
Together, these points offer one potential answer to the ‘being principled’ concern.
Since cognition is a form of computation and computation is location neutral, then
insofar as one is able to identify how computational systems are implemented via the
account of concrete computation offered, one has principled grounds on which to
distinguish internal and wide cognitive systems. Individuating internal and wide systems
simply requires identifying the right kind of conditions on physical computation.
Consider, again, the two previous examples. There, the two systems qualified as
physical computing systems in virtue of meeting all three conditions of mechanistic
computation. The only difference was that in the one case the system was partly
constituted by parts in the world, while in the other it was completely contained within
the individual. Insofar as wide computationalism relies on an account of concrete
computation that is sensitive to differences in mechanistic properties, it can distinguish
between computing systems instantiated both within and beyond the individual.
Consider a second concern. One debate that is near and dear to the heart of many
philosophers of mind is whether cognitive states represent intrinsically (in virtue of
themselves) or whether they represent in virtue of having meanings assigned to them.
The question is whether the mind has ‘original’ or ‘derived’ intentionality (Searle 1980,
1983; Dretske 1981). Segal (1997) raises concerns about original intentionality in the
context of wide computationalism:
Someone who claims that original intentionality is restricted to brains (or things
enough like brains) and certainly not something present in pieces of paper, or
even pocket calculators, is likely to be unimpressed by wide computationalism.
She would likely draw a distinction between cognition proper and mere compu-
tation. Cognition proper would be restricted to systems the symbols of which are
originally intentional. (p.153)
The worry is that whereas cognition trades in original content, wide computational
systems trade, at least partly, in derived content. Since wide systems do not deal in the
right kind of content, they should not be thought of as properly cognitive. There is a
long-standing debate over original intentionality, and this is not the place to enter into
the discussion. Suffice it to say, several authors have questioned the claim that original
intentionality forms any sort of Bmark of the cognitive^ (Dennett 1987; Wilson and
Clark 2009).
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For present purposes, what is important is that although semantic accounts are
compatible with computation, they in fact still require non-semantic individuation.
Functional and structural (non-semantic) properties, such as programming language
or architecture, are also going to contribute to the individuation of physical computa-
tions. Individuating computational systems by function alone – by what they represent
– will often fail to individuate physical computations finely enough. As long as
semantic information is built out of syntactic structure in some way, which is not only
plausible but the going view of most cognitive scientists, wide computationalism is
going to remain plausible. Even if it turns out that semantic accounts of computation
are correct, the syntactic underpinnings of semantic information still deliver wide
computationalism. Segal’s worry, then, is too quick. It fails to appreciate that compu-
tational cognition still is going to imply syntactic considerations of the kind pertinent to
wide computationalism, whether or not cognition turns out to trade in original or
derived content.
Finally, one might worry more generally about value of wide computationalism.
Does wide computationalism have anything to add as a research strategy to cognitive
science? Wilson (1994) has something like this concern in mind when he says: Bthe
most interesting issue concerns not the coherence of wide computationalism but the
extent to which a wide computational research strategy is and could be employed
within cognitive psychology^ (p.371).
Here is one way wide computationalism might be of wider use to cognitive science:
the ongoing debate over extended cognition. Some opponents of extended cognition
have suggested that environmental and bodily processes and states are too unwieldy to
be brought under a framework that also contains neural processes (Adams and Aizawa
2008; Rupert 2004, 2009). The Bmotley crew^ of extended cognition undermines its
chances of developing a scientifically tractable approach to cognition. Taking wide
computationalism seriously affords one answer to this challenge. This is because wide
computationalism provides a framework for investigating concrete physical computing
systems that cross into the world. Parts of the body and world can be integrated into and
thought of in terms of performing computations, insofar as they are part of wide
computational systems. Wide computationalism offers a potential rubric from within
which to conduct extended cognition research. One of the potential uses of wide
computationalism is its ability to link individualist forms of computational psychology
with more externalist-friendly extended approaches. It offers another prospective ship
on which to navigate the conceptual waters of cognitive science.
7 Conclusion
Time to take stock. I set out to show that wide computationalism offered an important
but overlooked option for cognitive science. I attempted to show that it offered not only
a coherent and plausible account of concrete computation, but that it also found
empirical support from examples in animal and human cognition. I further developed
the view by defending it from several potential objections and charting its potential use
for cognitive science more generally. This is by no means the final word on wide
computationalism. Much more work is required – for example, it still remains unclear
how wide computationalism fits with other core concepts in cognitive science and
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philosophy of mind such as functionalism, intentionality or representation. Nonethe-
less, what the preceding discussion has done, I hope, is convey the sense that wide
computationalism offers a substantive and viable supplement to existing individualistic
research strategies; that it provides a plausible and theoretically fruitful avenue for
cognitive science to further explore. Summatively speaking, it would not be unfair to
say that the prospects of wide computationalism are looking up.
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